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Practice, Pirates and Coast Guards: the
grand narrative of Somali piracy
CHRISTIAN BUEGER
ABSTRACT In this article I develop a practice–theoretical account to provide the
ﬁrst systematic investigation of the justiﬁcation of Somali piracy. Arguing for an
understanding of piracy as a ‘community of practice’, I show how this commu-
nity is organised by a ‘grand narrative’ that projects piracy as a quasi-state
practice of the protection of sovereignty against foreign intruders. Paying atten-
tion to narrative provides an explanation for the persistence of piracy and assists
us in understanding the phenomenon. Relying on publicly available interviews
with pirates, I deconstruct this grand narrative and detail the different functions
of the narrative in the light of situations in which it is told. The article develops
an alternative perspective on piracy based on the study of practice, narrative
and situation that provides new avenues for the study of clandestine, illicit or
violent practices.
In what was one of the most proliﬁc early incidents of Somali piracy—the
September 2008 hijacking of the MV Faina, an Ukrainian freighter loaded with
weapons—pirate spokesperson Sugule Ali offered a 45-minute interview with
the New York Times’ correspondent. He gave a rationale for the hijacking and
was cited as follows:
Q. Are you going to sell the weapons to insurgents?
A. No. We don’t want these weapons to go to anyone in Somalia. Somalia has suf-
fered from many years of destruction because of all these weapons. We don’t want
that suffering and chaos to continue. We are not going to ofﬂoad the weapons. We
just want the money.
Q. Have the pirates been misunderstood?
A. We don’t consider ourselves sea bandits [‘sea bandit’ is one way Somalis trans-
late the English word pirate]. We consider sea bandits those who illegally ﬁsh in
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our seas and dump waste in our seas and carry weapons in our seas. We are simply
patrolling our seas. Think of us like a coast guard.1
It was mainly two passages of the above interview that made it into the head-
lines. Ali’s claim ‘we just want money’ became a major headline and the projec-
tion of piracy as a form of coast guard was widely referenced. The interview
impressed even public relations professionals. PR Weekly commented:
Time and time again, PR pros wax poetic about engaging with audiences openly.
Here, pirate Ali shows the way to being an able, available, and transparent spokes-
man, and readers ﬁnd themselves feeling sympathetic toward the pirates who might
be arrested for acting on their pirate instincts.2
Ali’s account, according to which Somali pirates act to protect their waters
from illegal foreign intruders, is a frequently told story. Somali pirates have
been everything but media shy. In TV documentaries, press interviews or
court rooms a similar story has been told by self-proclaimed, suspected or
convicted pirates. These stories have a considerable narrative consistency.
Piracy is cast as a normal practice of protection against environmental crime,
resource robbery or the violation of borders, and as contributing to the eco-
nomic development of Somali regions. Although the dynamics of piracy have
changed since 2008—including the implementation of international naval
patrolling, extensive criminal persecution programmes and pressure on Somali
elites to act3—the core plot of the narrative remains stable over time. Given
these features, the ‘coast guard narrative’ can be considered as the ‘grand
narrative’ or the ‘master story’ of Somali piracy.
In this article I argue that the coastguard narrative has two core functions. It
ﬁrst provides coherence to the Somali piracy practice across time and space and
is a source of meaning for those participating in it. Phrased otherwise, the narra-
tive provides identity. Telling the narrative has, second, strategic purposes: it ren-
ders piracy more effective and attempts to produce legitimacy and recognition
for piracy as a practice that has socio-political objectives. My argument is based
on a practice–theoretical perspective as outlined in organisational theory and as
debated in International Relations as the ‘practice turn’.4 It claims to study piracy
as a practice, that is, an organised activity of multiple people constituted by
doings, sayings, objects and shared practical understandings. Narrative is a cen-
tral component of the organisation of a practice.
Such a perspective on practice and narrative provides a major alternative
framework to the increasingly unproductive debate within piracy studies and the
study of illicit actors. In this debate piracy is projected either in economic terms,
or as a wider socio-political phenomenon to be explained by the study of root
causes. Ali’s interview is worth citing at length since it points to the two major
interpretations of piracy. The ﬁrst is an understanding of piracy as a predomi-
nately illicit economic activity that can be described by basic economic princi-
ples. In short, piracy is then indeed only about ‘we just want money’. The
second interpretation understands piracy as a wider socio-political phenomenon
embedded in a distinct cultural context. In this case piracy is about more than
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money and is interpreted as a form of alternative development, resistance to
globalisation or protection against external inﬂuences.
The coast guard narrative is one of the core issues in the debate between
these two ‘paradigms of piracy’. The economic understanding rejects the narra-
tive and considers it to be a (strategic) lie; the holistic understanding embraces it,
or parts of it, and uses it as a clue to the ‘root causes’ of piracy. The perspectives
disagree about the truth value of the narrative and cast the analysis of it as an
‘epistemic’ question. Yet identifying evidence for either side is difﬁcult. Collect-
ing evidence in a war-shattered country is problematic, facts are difﬁcult to
establish and attempts to depoliticise the debate have largely failed. The episte-
mic controversy is unproductive. The practice–theoretical perspective redirects
the debate from an epistemic to a phronetic evaluation.5 Such a type of analysis
seeks out the functionality of the narrative and the practical effects that it pro-
duces for the organisation of piracy and its environments. ‘Stories have func-
tions. They do particular kind of work.’6 I hence argue that the coast guard
narrative should be treated as an integral part of piracy practice and as a mean-
ingful ﬁction that has observable organisational and political effects.
The remainder of the article is organised as follows. The next section brieﬂy
reviews the discussion of piracy studies. I argue for avoiding reductionism and
for the need to combine insights from different perspectives. I proceed by outlin-
ing a practice–theoretical perspective of piracy and discuss the role of narrative.
The third section deconstructs the coast guard narrative and investigates its ele-
ments. Then I study a range of episodes in which the narrative has been told, in
order to unravel its effects in different situations. The ﬁnal section concludes and
sketches the importance of such a form of analysis for understanding the prac-
tices of other illicit actors in an ethnographically sensitive way.
Theorising piracy
A growing literature analyses the phenomenon of contemporary maritime
piracy.7 The primary focus has been on the conditions that give rise to piracy,
and the tempo-spatial variations and different types of piracy. Cross-regional
studies using large-n analysis, as well as a range of case studies, have provided
insights on the conditions under which piracy ﬂourishes.8 These include:
1. geography—proximity to a major sea lane and maritime trafﬁcking, as
well as hideouts close-by;
2. weak law enforcement structures;
3. collaboration by ofﬁcials and administrations (corruption);
4. a degree of infrastructure, such as ports, markets or roads needed for the
logistics of running a piracy operation;
5. the presence of a populace which can be recruited for piracy and which
supports operations with logistics;
6. skills and experience necessary to run an operations (eg navigation
skills);
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7. a degree of cultural acceptability of piracy, which renders it a legitimate
activity;
8. high levels of poverty and a lack of sources of income.
Two ‘paradigms’ can be identiﬁed in the debate, which provide quite differ-
ent interpretations of piracy: an ‘economic’ one, and a ‘holistic socio-politi-
cal’ one. While all these factors arguably matter, the paradigms disagree
over their signiﬁcance and the causal mechanisms they entail. Economic
approaches exclusively focus on factors two (weak law enforcement) and
eight (poverty). The suggested mechanism draws on a rational-choice logic
and the emergence of piracy is related to an individual’s calculation of the
costs and beneﬁts of participating in piracy. Hallwood and Miceli, for
instance, suggest that pirates are ‘rational maximizers’.9 As they argue, ‘since
the primary motivation for maritime pirates is material gain, whether derived
from the conﬁscation of cargo or the seeking of ransom for hostages, it
seems reasonable to suppose that they too are acting in a rational way’.10 In
this line of reasoning there are two relevant calculations. The ﬁrst is an indi-
vidual calculation weighing the beneﬁts of piracy (a share of the booty or
ransom) against its costs (the risk of death, persecution and penalisation).
The core factor emphasised is the risk of getting caught (the law enforce-
ment factor). The second calculation draws primarily on the poverty factor,
and is one in which an individual weighs the costs and beneﬁts of piracy
against other sources of income. From such a perspective the broader range
of factors listed above is of secondary relevance in as far as these may (or
may not) affect these calculations. The shortcomings of the economic
understanding lie mainly in their exclusive focus on the individual and his
decision on whether to join a piracy operation. Collective cultural dynamics
are largely neglected. In arguing at the level of a generic, rational logic,
there is a tendency to side-line contextual and situation-speciﬁc factors, and
to downplay the symbolic and normative side of piracy (eg the aspect of
cultural acceptability).
The second paradigm develops a broader, more holistic understanding
of piracy. The focus is on the whole set of factors, with emphasis placed
on factors two, three, ﬁve, six and seven.11 The mechanism by which
these are considered signiﬁcant are crucially different from the economic
paradigm. While the economic understanding focuses on the individual’s
calculation, the holistic one emphasises structures. The sums of the factors
are interpreted as (causal) structures that produce piracy. In interpreting
piracy in the light of Somalia’s state failure, economic deﬁcits and weak
coastal resource management, the argument is that piracy is a reaction to
these structures and, indeed, a form of response or resistance to it. Hence,
while economic understandings overemphasise individuals and their calcula-
tions, holistic accounts tend to overstate structure and neglect individual
agency.
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Towards a narrative/practice approach
I propose to understand piracy as a practice, and Somali pirates as a loose com-
munity of practice. Such an understanding has several beneﬁts. It offers an
understanding that can integrate core ideas and results from the economic and
socio-political paradigms. It offers an alternative to the narrow agency model of
the economic understanding and acknowledges the importance of structures in
conditioning the behaviour of the piracy collective, as well as developing an
understanding of piracy as a socially organised practical activity. It directs atten-
tion to the question of how piracy works and on which material and symbolic
resources it draws. Most importantly it is a perspective that gives us an explicit
framework for the role of narrative and provides insights into the effects of the
coast guard narrative.
Practice theories have been formulated in recent years against the background
of a set of shared assumptions drawn from cultural or interpretive (linguistic
turn) theorising.12 Practices can be understood as a ‘type of behaviour which
consists of several elements, interconnected to one other: forms of bodily activi-
ties, forms of mental activities, “things” and their use, a background knowledge
in the form of understanding, know-how, states of emotion and motivational
knowledge’.13 Practices are socially recognised forms of activity, in sum related
to distinct social communities. A social practice is a regular bodily activity held
together by a socially standardised way of understanding and knowing.
From such a perspective piracy is a practice comprised of various elements. It
includes activities, such as going out to sea and targeting vessels, boarding ves-
sels, stealing valuables, taking hostages, steering vessels, safeguarding hostages
and vessels, negotiating ransoms, releasing vessels and crews, and distributing
ransom income. It requires supporting activities, including the procurement of
equipment and weapons or food deliveries during a hostage period. It relies on
organising roles in hijacking or during the hostage period or sharing ransoms. A
range of objects is required to perform the practice, including skiffs, weapons,
navigation devices, or ladders for boarding. To perform the practice, moreover, a
range of skills and practical know-how is necessary, including navigation skills,
knowledge of how to board vessels, to handle hostages, negotiate or organise
ransom deliveries. Hence the practice of piracy draws on an extensive repertoire
of activities and objects and on various types of skill and practical knowledge.
Many of the skills necessary to perform piracy are widespread in Somalia and
form part of a traditional cultural repertoire. Instances include the navigation
skills of ﬁshermen and dhow traders, or the negotiation skills provided by a soci-
ety governed by customary law and informal governance processes.14 Skills such
as the handling of weapons have been learned in decades of civil war; others,
such as the handling of navigation devices or boarding skills, have been acquired
during attempts at setting up coast guards.15 In addition, (land-based) kidnap and
ransom taking had become a widespread practice in Somalia before the rise of
piracy, hence skills and experience transferred to piracy practice.16 In this sense
the practice of piracy is primarily a realignment of pre-existing skills.
Foregrounding these skills demonstrates that an individual cannot simply
decide to become a pirate. To participate in piracy one either already possesses a
THE GRAND NARRATIVE OF SOMALI PIRACY
1815
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [C
ard
iff
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ari
es
] a
t 0
4:2
7 1
4 M
arc
h 2
01
4 
range of needed skills (such as navigation skills) and learns through engagement
with others how to use them for piracy, or has to learn from scratch the various
skills required to perform piracy. Moreover, to engage in piracy one has to col-
laborate with others and organise a collective enterprise. Practices are social in
the sense that they are shared and performed by a distinct collective. In this sense
we can speak about Somali pirates forming a ‘community of practice’: they per-
form the practice of piracy together. Various evidence points to Somali pirates
operating in gangs or syndicates.17 Estimates suggest numbers between ﬁve and
12 of such groups. Although these groups operate independently from each
other, they do cooperate in sharing supplies or information.18 The concept of a
community of practice shows that, although these groups might be formally inde-
pendent from each other, participants in piracy are nonetheless engaged in a
common project. The community of piracy practice is constituted, ﬁrst, by
mutual engagement, that is, people working together, talking to each other and
exchanging information; second, as a joint enterprise whose meaning is negoti-
ated among members of the community; and, third, as a shared repertoire used in
practice, including the elements mentioned above.19 Such a repertoire, however,
is also comprised of symbols and gestures, language tools and concepts, as well
as stories and narratives.
In what way are narratives important for communities of practices? Narratives
are crucial for the repertoire constituting a practice and providing coherence to it.
They are the outcome as well as representative of the constant negotiation of a
common enterprise. Telling and re-telling stories is a core activity in any
practice. As Wagenaar puts it ‘storytelling is what being a competent member of
a particular community is about’.20 Neumann points to two functions of narra-
tives: an orchestration function stabilising an existing practice and its hierarchies
and power relations; and a creative function opening up the possibilities for new
practices and providing the source for a creative change or adjustment to
situations. 21 Narratives often
go in a procession ahead of social practices in order to open a ﬁeld for them […]
Storytelling […] authorise an unprecedented practice. Order is constituted, subject
positions created and these and other phenomena named so that a new practice
may take shape in a relevant context.22
Thus the coast guard narrative can be interpreted as preceding the practice of
Somali piracy and having a core function in establishing the practice in Somalia.
Wagenaar outlines further core features of narratives: by giving meaning to action,
narratives give coherence to a practice, provide a connection between the past,
present and future, and they offer an interpretative template for adjusting to new
situations. They ‘create some kind of meaningful cohesion in a situation that
doesn’t necessarily have that cohesion by itself’.23 Narratives tend to present real-
ity as more coherent and more meaningful than it is. People ‘are constantly faced
with the task of not only ﬁguring out what to do, but also of how to account for
whatever they did’.24 Narratives provide a representation of this process. They
are, moreover, a way of reducing complexity by giving a general outline of how
things hang together. ‘They provide the actor with suggestions for acting, and they
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give the actor a certain measure of provisional certainty that allows him to act at
all.’25 Because of this, stories are stubborn and resist change even in the face of
contradictory empirical data. Crucial to narratives is the fact that they provide a
moral compass useful for making practical judgements or negotiating moral
dilemmas. Narratives tend to create a system of moral positions, and stories are
about the intentions of actors, their actions as well as their consequences.
In summary, narratives ‘provide actors with the reasons for acting and with
intimations about the course of action that are more adequate in a given situa-
tion’.26 Seen in such a light the coast guard narrative is an important part of
Somali piracy practice and analysing the narrative in depth offers major insights
for understanding piracy. In the next section I reconstruct the coast guard narra-
tive and discuss it in relation to the different situations in which it is uttered.
Reconstructing the coast guard narrative
A good story deals in possibilities, not certainties.27
In this section I analyse the coast guard narrative in two analytical steps. First, I
reconstruct the content of the narrative by investigating its constituent elements.
I draw on sequences from print and video interviews that journalists have con-
ducted with pirates. These sequences can be considered as ‘antenarratives’,28 that
is, in situ stories told by individuals, which, if analysed together, provide a view
of the larger grand narrative. Second, I scrutinise the functionality of the narra-
tive in relation to the piracy community of practice as well as the different audi-
ences which are part of its environment. This is to recognise that narratives work
relationally and that ‘the meaning of a story is not locked up in the constituent
elements of the text, but is constructed—actively, dynamically—in a continuous
interaction among the storyteller, the elements of the story, his audience, and the
environment they share’.29 Phrased otherwise, the coast guard narrative has
different effects in different situations and in relation to difference audiences. I
adopt a strategy of zooming out by ﬁrst looking at the community of piracy
practice, then its immediate periphery and then the broader environment.
Core elements of the coast guard narrative
Central to the coast guard narrative is a vocabulary of law and order. The
purpose of the practice is described as protection from threats. Piracy practice is
presented as the performance of quasi-state functions, and as orderly and rule-
based. The core signiﬁer used to describe the activity is that of a ‘coast guard’.
This is reﬂected in the fact that pirate groups have given themselves names that
include the term ‘coast guard’, like the ‘Kismayo Volunteer Coastguards’, the
‘Somalia Marines for Hobyo and Haradheere’ or ‘National Volunteer
Coastguard’.30 This understanding is further reﬂected in self-descriptions such as
the following two:
THE GRAND NARRATIVE OF SOMALI PIRACY
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I, as do most pirates, consider myself as having been performing the duties of a
coastguard.31
We had to defend ourselves. We became watchmen of our coasts and took up our
duty to protect the country. Don’t call us pirates. We are protectors.32
Note that both statements indicate that the practice is shared (‘most pirates’,
‘we’) and that the activity is not considered to be a form of work or employment,
but as the performance of a ‘duty’ which serves higher purposes than merely
gaining income. The second statement describes the practice as one of ‘protec-
tion’. The reference object requiring protection is described as ‘our coasts’ and
‘the country’. In other statements we also ﬁnd references to ‘our seas’,33 or to
‘our waters’.34
What does the term ‘our’ refer to? The use of ‘the country’ as reference
object indicates that the frame of reference is not that of property (a territory
considered to be ‘owned’), but that of sovereignty: the ‘our’ refers to a form of
legitimate authority over territory. Such a link becomes strengthened if we
consider the frequent use of references to principles of legality. The threatening
actors from which the territory requires protection are, for instance, described as
‘those who illegally ﬁsh in our seas and dump waste in our seas’.35
Throughout the statements of pirates there are recurrent references to legality
and the term ‘illegal’ is employed to describe the activities that are the object of
the practice. By adopting the work description of a ‘coast guard’ and describing
the practice as a form of protecting sovereignty and addressing illegal activities,
the coast guard narrative projects the community of piracy practice as one that
performs state-like functions. It is a practice of restoring and maintaining good
order at sea. In other words, the practice is considered as a form of ‘alternative
maritime security governance’ and as a rule-based activity which ensures compli-
ance with legal standards. The following sequence goes even further in claiming
that there is nothing extraordinary about the conduct of pirates. The activities are
normalised and presented as a routine task: ‘We are patrolling our seas. This is a
normal thing for people to do in their region’.36
This motive of piracy activity as a normal routine task and form of quasi-
governmental activity is also observable if descriptions of the purpose of taking
ransoms are analysed. Consider the following two statements:
The ransom they pay is somehow a punishment for their illegal activity in the
Somali water, especially in the era without government.37
We don’t see the hijacking as a criminal act but as a road tax because we have no
central government that can control our sea.38
Both sequences argue that the need for ransoms arises because of the absence of
an efﬁcient government. They suggest that ransom taking is a form of normal
quasi-state taxation. The narrative identiﬁes two main threats that the coast
guards are supposed to protect from, namely, ‘illegal ﬁshing’ and ‘toxic waste
dumping’ (or ‘to dump poison’). Both threats provide different frames of
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reference in terms of what is protected. Illegal ﬁshing threatens a form of
livelihood and a distinct source of income and hence refers to an economic and
professional frame.
I agreed to engage in piracy because we wanted to get back at the illegal foreign
vessels that were ﬁshing in our waters, denying us a livelihood. We targeted foreign
cargo vessels for that reason.39
This statement is not only revealing for demonstrating that narratives do not
necessarily follow a logical sequence, but also shows that what is at stake is a
livelihood. The second threat of toxic waste or poison dumping adds additional
dimensions to the narrative. While ﬁshing requires specialised ﬁshing vessels,
any ship, including cargo ships, can dump toxic waste and, hence, become a
potential justiﬁed target. This threat adds a further sense of urgency to the
narrative. The ‘duty to protect’ becomes not only an issue of illegality, the
violation of sovereignty, or an issue of income and livelihood. It is now directly
linked to health and the physical survival of coastal populations. Finally,
compared to ﬁshing, waste dumping is also a much more diffuse threat, since its
cause–effect relations are less visible and traceable.
Narratives provide a system of moral positions in so far as they describe the
motives of actors and consequences. They provide a compass to navigate
through complex moral dilemmas. The coast guard narrative provides a compass
ﬁrst by describing piracy as a reaction to and consequence of the behaviour of
others. Consider the following two statements:
reacting to the toxic waste that has been continually dumped on the shores of our
country for nearly 20 years […] The Somali coastline has been destroyed and we
believe this money is nothing compared to the devastation that we have seen on
the seas.40
We did not bring this problem; this problem was brought to us […] I believe the
title of pirates should be given to those who come to our waters illegally […]
Fishermen in Eyl ﬁrst hijacked trawlers to levy an informal tax and to punish them
for stealing their ﬁsh. Later they targeted cargo ships.41
As we can see from these statements, the narrative has a temporal sequence and
describes piracy practice as a reaction or response to the activities of others. The
problem is presented as brought about by external forces, and piracy practice is a
consequence to outside actions. Hence a relation is established in which
responsibility for violence is moved to external actors. The quote also points to
another dimension of the narrative, namely, the way it negotiates the meaning of
the concept of ‘piracy’ or, as it is translated from Somali, ‘sea banditry’. Within
the narrative the concept of piracy refers to those who are acting illegally. A
clear moral standard is hence provided, which is maybe most vividly expressed
in the following passage:
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If you hold hostage innocent people, that’s a crime. If you hold hostage people
who are doing illegal activities that is not a crime.42
How the narrative is used as a moral compass to interpret events and situations
of uncertainty can be seen in the following passage. It is based on the
observations of a Somali journalist and details how the narrative is used to inter-
pret the naval counter-piracy missions launched in 2008.
According to numerous conversations I have had with Somalis they tend to present
a different version. According to these Somalis countries such as Spain and France
whom Somalis perceive to be the biggest ﬁsh-pirates in the Somali waters use the
Security Council, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and coalitions of
friendly countries in sending warships to Somalia for the protection of their ﬁshing
trawlers. As a result a number of innocent countries such as UK, Norway and
Denmark to just name a few have joined the band wagon. These countries naively
think that they are ﬁghting pirates while the reality is that they are protecting the
interests of France and Spain.43
This example shows how the narrative leads to a distinction between innocent
and criminal countries. It also documents how it is used to interpret a new situa-
tion—the presence of naval forces in the Gulf of Aden.
Narrative, situations and audiences
Through the study of several sequences from interviews with pirates we have
gained an understanding of the core elements of the coast guard narrative. The
narrative projects piracy as a rule-based, quasi-state practice of protection against
threats to the economic and physical survival of Somali, and as a ‘normal’ prac-
tice of patrolling or taxation. The narrative has a strong moral dimension and
draws heavily on the concept of legality. Narratives do different kinds of work
and they perform different functions. To get closer to these functions and the
practical value of the narrative, story-telling needs to be studied in relation to dif-
ferent situations and audiences.
The coast guard narrative and the community of piracy practice. The coast
guard narrative has at least two functions for the community of piracy practice.
First, it provides a symbolic resource; second, it serves instrumental purposes.
Narratives create a sense of belonging to a common enterprise. They provide a
source of meaning for making sense of everyday activities and add purpose to
activities to serve a collective project. Phrased otherwise, narratives create a
mutual identity. The coast guard narrative gives a sense of piracy practice as
serving higher and worthwhile goals. The coast guard narrative then creates a
collective identity for Somali pirates. One of the effects of a collective identity is
that it strengthens a culture of cooperation and collaboration. In this sense the
narrative is a constitutive element of the community of practice and a core
resource for identifying a shared enterprise. As noted above, pirates operate in a
structure of dispersed organisational units. They are organised in different gangs
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or syndicates and operate from different bases. Although units are scattered,
there is a degree of cooperation. Observers suggest that the units cooperate with
each other in sharing information, logistics or supplies. Others point to frequent
meetings of leaders of units in a form of assembly.44 According to reports, cross-
gang violence is relatively low. The narrative provides a mediator in the sense
that pirate gangs recognise each other as being engaged in a common project.
One of the effects of the coast guard narrative can hence be seen as contributing
to internal coherence and collaboration within the community of piracy practice.
The coast guard narrative provides a particular type of identity. It presents
piracy as a rule-based practice in which participants have duties, work in the
frame of legality and engage in acts such as taxation. Such an understanding is
in line with observations that piracy organisations are heavily rule-based. This
includes rules for sharing ransom proﬁts, but also behavioural rules punishing
violence against other pirates, robbery on vessels, or the mistreatment of hos-
tages.45 Indeed, the degree of rule following has surprised external as well as
Somali observers. A French naval commander has been cited as saying that
‘They are very well organized, have good communication systems and rules of
engagement’.46 An elder in the Eyl region observed: ‘I have never seen gangs
that have rules like these. They avoid many of the things that are all too common
with other militias.’47
The coast guard narrative can be seen, on the one side, as a representation of
this degree of rule following. On the other side, the narrative is also productive
of this behaviour and a symbolic resource by which compliance is achieved.
Serving in a coast guard that has the duty to protect implies much more disci-
plined behaviour compared with serving for instance in a militia. As Leeson has
argued, rules are instrumental for a successful and efﬁcient pirate organisation.48
In the absence of governmental regulation, pirates require a rule-based system of
checks and balances to prevent internal predation, minimise crew conﬂict, and
maximise the pirates’ proﬁt. As he suggests, ‘organized criminals are as inter-
ested in creating order among themselves as noncriminals. They, too, have an
incentive to develop solutions to obstacles that otherwise prevent them from
cooperating for mutual gain.’49
Leeson’s instrumental perspective on piracy also points us to a third important
function of the coast guard narrative, namely that of rendering piracy more efﬁ-
cient. As he shows in drawing on the case of historical piracy, symbolic
resources are important for cultivating a ‘particular type of reputation’.50 The
coast guard narrative emphasises the orderly and calculable character of pirates.
Such a reputation is instrumental for the core of the piracy business: the negotia-
tion of ransoms. Presenting oneself as rational and calculable is instrumental in a
negotiation process for at least two reasons. First, ransom payment is built on a
relationship of trust, implying that the ransom seeker appears credible and
releases the hostages and vessels after payment. Second, an orderly and organ-
ised reputation makes the ransom seeker appear less vulnerable and hence
reduces the likelihood of rescue attempts and the use of force. Storytelling is thus
a part of negotiation processes. Pirates are especially media active in critical
cases of negotiation. Several of the passages discussed above were part of critical
negotiation processes. For example, the interview with Sugule Ali, presented in
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the introduction, was part of the negotiations over the release of the MV Faina, a
critical case, since the vessel was carrying a high-value load of weapons, includ-
ing tanks. Seen in the situation of negotiations the coast guard narrative has the
function of making negotiation more efﬁcient by creating the appearance of a
reliable negotiation partner and ensuring that no lethal forces is used.
The narrative has further instrumental functions. It is valuable as a legal
defence strategy. Uttering it has utility in the event that a pirate is arrested and
prosecuted, either in anticipation of such an event (as preventive strategy) or in
the actual case. The narrative can be used to ensure milder forms of punishment,
such as shorter prison sentences. As Leeson remarks:
Pirates, like other people, are not passive responders to the law. As (or if) the law
becomes an important constraint on pirates’ behavior, they will seek to offset its
effects. Pirates will manipulate the law as the law manipulates them.51
While this is not the place to address the legal dimension of piracy, the coast
guard narrative has been used in courts around the world to make the case for
lower sentences or even innocence, and has hence demonstrated its usefulness in
courtroom situations. A further function of the narrative is that it opens up an
exit strategy. This follows the simple logic that the main solution to piracy is to
establish effective coast guards. Through the representation of piracy as reliable,
state-resembling practice, and through the use of the term coast guards, the narra-
tive creates the possibility for the retired pirate to actually serve in such a coast
guard. Pirates have explicitly made this offer, claiming that they would
disengage from piracy, if they could get employment in an ofﬁcial government-
sponsored coastguard. Through the representation of the coast guard narrative,
and given that pirates possess many of the skills and experience that is required
for working in a coast guard, employing them appears a natural step. Such a
strategy has already proven to be successful and retired pirates have started to
work as counter-piracy advisors for the Puntland government and international
organisations.52
In summary, the coast guard narrative performs different functions within the
community of piracy practice; it establishes a common identity, enables a coopo-
rative culture, ensures compliance with rules, is an integral part of negotiations,
and provides legal and exit strategies. Some of these narrative functions are more
symbolic, others more instrumental. The key question is, however, not whether
pirates tell the coastguard narrative because they believe in it, or because of
expected beneﬁts. Telling the coast guard story is part of being a member of the
community of piracy practice. The narrative is powerful because it is multifunc-
tional. So far we have primarily investigated the internal functions of the narra-
tive for practising piracy. Scrutinising how the narrative is used in handling the
relationship with audiences at the peripheries of the community of counter-piracy
reveals further functions.
The narrative and local audiences. At the periphery of the community of piracy
the narrative has a crucial role in relation to at least three audiences: prospective
recruits, coastal communities and local elites and ofﬁcials. The narrative has a
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function in recruitment. Recruitment in piracy operations is competitive, since a
signiﬁcant pool of young Somalis is readily available to participate. The narra-
tive is, ﬁrst, a tool for ensuring that this pool remains large and, second, a means
of recruiting the specialists required for performing the practice, notably
individuals possessing naval skills and those with language skills who can act as
negotiators. Two elements of the coast guard narrative make it especially valu-
able for recruitment: the way it addresses the concerns of coastal populations
and hence attracts individuals with naval skills, and the way it frames the
practice as one of serving the higher purposes of protecting the country. Indeed,
it is notably the heroic element of the narrative which gives it recruitment poten-
tial. Several observers have pointed out the status of pirates as local heroes.53 As
a pirate put it, ‘we consider ourselves heroes’.54An observer suggests that
‘membership of “the Coast Guards” family is regarded as a prestigious badge of
honour among many in Somalia’.55 The narrative is effective in creating this
status of pirates as heroes defending their country. Through the narrative piracy
becomes culturally acceptable.
The cultural acceptability created through the narrative is not only functional
for recruitment, but also for ensuring the support of local populations. Piracy
operations are to a large degree dependent on coastal communities. Coastal com-
munities provide shelter and are part of the logistics of a piracy operation. Espe-
cially in cases of extended hostage periods, local communities are required to
provide food, water and other basic goods for the hostages and guards, as well
as for the members of a piracy gang waiting for ransom delivery. The fact that
the narrative projects piracy as defending the interests of coastal communities is
important in this regard. Visits by journalists to villages supporting piracy have
observed that coastal communities also rely on the narrative to justify their sup-
port for piracy gangs. A senior resident of the village of Eyl, for instance, is
quoted as saying:
I don’t call them pirates. They are our marines. They are protecting our resources
from those looting them. They are not criminals.56
His statement was accompanied by applause from a small surrounding
audience.57 The narrative helps to ensure local support, especially since not all
members of local populations support the pirates. Indeed, there is also a consid-
erable local counter-piracy movement. A survey sponsored by the NGO Norwe-
gian Church Aid even suggested that 95% of the local populations was opposed
to pirates.58 As observed by Gettleman, ‘the pirates are increasingly viewed as
stains on the devoutly Muslim, nomadic culture, blamed for introducing big-city
evils like drugs, alcohol, street brawling and AIDS’.59
Indeed, the stronger the success of local counter-piracy campaigns and the
more that piracy is associated with introducing problems, the more important is
the recurrent telling of the coastguard narrative. For instance, interviewed in the
light of a report which suggested increasing piracy induced violence against local
populations, a pirate is quoted as saying:
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we are not creating insecurity in our country, we are keeping our seas secure from
the foreign enemy, those who are ﬁshing illegally as well as those using our seas to
dump poisons. We will continue hijacking their vessels until they are gone from
our waters.60
The coastguard narrative is a stable feature of Somali piracy. It is, however, use-
ful for rallying support not only among local populations, but also among Somali
elites and ofﬁcials. The narrative is instrumental in forging alliances with these
elites in that it suggests a common interest. To provide one example: when the
Somali parliament in Mogadishu debated a national counter-piracy law there
were signiﬁcant voices supportive of pirates.61 Some members of parliament
described pirates as ‘heroes for keeping foreign ﬁshing ﬂeets away from Somali
shores, and said they were acting as unofﬁcial coastguards’.62 One member is
quoted as saying that ‘The pirates are...ﬁghting the foreign ships that are plunder-
ing our ﬁsh and other marine resources’.63
In summary, the coastguard narrative is also vital if seen in the light of the
relations between the community of piracy practice and its periphery. It is instru-
mental in recruitment, notably of those possessing navigation and language
skills. It ensures support from coastal communities providing shelter and supplies
and forges alliances with local elites and ofﬁcials. If we step even further out
from the community of piracy practice and follow how the narrative is used in
international arenas, we would be able to identify even further functionalities of
the narrative. Part of the narrative is that it internationalises piracy, since it is a
reaction to other international actors.
The coast guard narrative is an integrative feature for the practice of Somali
piracy. It is a powerful frame for sense-making and has considerable instrumental
value. Investigating how the narrative is used in different contexts has revealed a
number of its different functions, ranging from enhancing internal collaboration,
efﬁciency of piracy operations, to handling the relations at the periphery of the
piracy community of practice and in its broader environment.
Conclusion
This article has developed an alternative perspective on contemporary piracy by
understanding piracy as a practice and its organisational form as a community of
practice. This alternative framework puts us in the position for conducting a phro-
netic evaluation of the grand narrative of Somali piracy. Rather than addressing
the narrative on an epistemic level, and asking whether its claims are true or not,
we have seen how promising it is to ask why a narrative is told in the ﬁrst place
and what effects it has. Instead of being concerned about facts or whether anyone
actually believes in the narratives or not, we can treat the narrative as a meaning-
ful ﬁction which gives coherence to the practice of piracy and produces different
effects. Scrutinising the practical value of the narrative has shown us why it is so
sticky and why it is persistently told. Simply put, the narrative is of high practical
utility for different people in different situations. It is a tool for sense-making, for
understand one’s place in the world and interpreting new situations. It is also of
instrumental value in improving the efﬁciency of piracy operations.
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The analysis also has policy implications. International counter-piracy actors
have increasingly recognised that it is important not to side-line the concerns
(about over-ﬁshing and toxic waste dumping) expressed in the coast guard narra-
tive too quickly. Indeed, there is a growing willingness to pay attention to these
problems. More attention has been paid recently to counter-piracy campaigns
which aim to de-legitimise piracy by pointing to its negative effects.64 As the
analysis has shown, narratives are persistent. The coastguard narrative is sticky
and will even continue to be told in the light of counter-evidence. It is important
that de-justiﬁcation narratives are carefully designed and respond to the concerns
expressed within the coast guard narrative. So far the main counter-narratives
being told are faith-based.65 Arguably this needs to be rethought and the types of
messages disseminated need to respond to concerns such as the protection of
resources, the creation of order and new levels of trust in state ofﬁcials. It is
important to keep in mind that the narrative will also provide a powerful
resource for the renaissance of Somali piracy at any time. Even though since
2012 pirate activity has been signiﬁcantly lower, as long as the narrative
continues to be told there is a pertinent risk of the return of large-scale piracy in
Somalia.
While the beneﬁts of such a discussion to academic piracy studies and
counter-piracy policies are immediately apparent, the approach developed is also
useful in the larger context of the study of armed groups and organised crime.
Taking practice as the core unit of analysis ﬁrst allows for a form of analysis
which is impartial towards questions of the (political) status of a violent group
and its organisational form. No a priori claim is necessary regarding whether the
group pursues only ﬁnancial gains or also political objectives. Second, although
practices are ideally understood through immersion in the action, participant
observation is not always feasible in the context of war and insecurity. This does
not, however, imply that the ethnographic methodological apparatus is useless.
Quite the contrary: the analysis of narratives presented here demonstrates that,
even under conditions where analysis is undertaken from distance (the metaphor-
ical armchair), ethnographic sensitivity provides a revealing instrument. In that
sense the methodological strategy developed in this article will also be promising
in other ﬁelds, and for understanding practices which are difﬁcult to access
directly through ﬁeld research, participant observation or interviews.
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